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Salt, Smurthwaite, and
Smith: The Origins of the
Modern Legal Identity of
the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints
Nathan B. Oman

In 2019 there existed a legal entity known as The Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints.1 This fact will likely strike most readers
as unexceptional. More interesting, however, prior to 2019 there had
been no such legal entity as the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints for over 150 years, the last of that name likely having been
disincorporated in 1862. Even more strangely, although there were
millions of people around the globe who identified themselves as
Latter-day Saints, in 2019 the only member of the legal entity known as
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints was Russell M. Nelson.
This somewhat surprising state of affairs is the result of how the efforts
to disestablish the established colonial churches in the wake of the
American Revolution created a body of corporate law in the United
NATHAN B. OMAN is the Rollins Professor of Law at William & Mary Law
School. He received his BA from Brigham Young University and his JD
from Harvard Law School. He is currently writing a book on the Latterday Saint legal tradition.
1 See Human Resources Department, The Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints, “Further Chances to Emphasize the Correct Name of
the Church of Jesus Christ,” email message in author's possession, June
19, 2019 (explaining that the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints has been merged with the
Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints and been renamed).
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States with a distinctly Protestant inflection; and how the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, with its hierarchical emphasis on
prophetic authority and its massive ecclesiastical ambitions, became
entangled within and ultimately resisted that body of law. It may also
have been the result of a bitter dispute over salt, now long forgotten but
famous at the time, between Joseph F. Smith, president of the church
from 1901 to 1918, and Charles Smurthwaite, a Utah entrepreneur.2
Beginning in 1830, the church struggled to define the nature of
its legal personality. During the lifetime of Joseph Smith it attempted
to formally incorporate under the laws of two states. No American
jurisdiction at the time, however, provided a legal form that meshed
harmoniously with the ecclesiastical structure and government of
the church, contributing to the chaos that marked its legal affairs
at the time of Smith’s murder. The Latter-day Saints took advantage
of the comparative legal independence of early territorial Utah
to incorporate the church in a way that allowed it to pursue its
ecclesiastical ambitions, but this legal structure soon drew the ire
of Congress. In the late 1880s, as the federal government’s crusade
against polygamy reached its height, the corporate structure of the
church became a key legal battleground. In the aftermath of those
battles, the church chose to eschew any centralized legal entity for
its affairs, despite its hierarchal ecclesiology. Unresolved questions
came to a head when controversies over post-Manifesto polygamy and
church business enterprises boiled over into litigation during Joseph
F. Smith’s administration. Smurthwaite, an excommunicated Mormon
businessman, and Don Carlos Musser, the scion of a prominent
Latter-day Saint family, sued Smith over the use of tithing funds.
The case drew national media attention, and pitted two of the most
prominent and talented members of the Utah Bar—church general
counsel Franklin S. Richards and former Utah Supreme Court justice
Charles Zane—against one another. Ultimately Richards prevailed,
but the case vividly illustrated the precarious nature of the church’s
ambigious legal structure and likely contributed to the creation of
the corporate entity that continues legally to embody the church
today.
2 Evidence of its notoriety at the time can be seen in the fact that
in his 1911 exposé of Mormon affairs in Utah, Frank Cannon devoted
considerable space to the case. See Frank J. Cannon and Harvey J.
O’Higgins, Under the Prophet in Utah: The National Menace of a Political
Priestcraft (Boston, MA: C. M. Clark Publishing, 1911), 323–26.
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A Brief History of the Church
as a Legal Entity to 1905
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints was born into a legal
system defined by the legacy of America’s first disestablishment. In
1774, nine of the thirteen colonies had established churches, all of
which had been abandoned by the end of the 1830s. The New York
law that Joseph Smith tried to use to organize his new church in 1830
was the result of more than a century of conflict over the legal status
of New York’s established church.3 The colony of New Amsterdam was
founded by the Dutch West India Company in 1625. While nominally
committed to the Dutch Reformed Church, the company consistently
subordinated Calvinist orthodoxy to commercial expediency by
adopting a tolerant stance toward religion. After the English takeover
of New Amsterdam in 1664, royal officials sought to create an established Anglican Church by granting special benefits to the Church
of England and incorporating Trinity Church in New York City, the
wealthiest and most important Anglican congregation in the colony. By
the time of the Revolution, however, Trinity Church was widely hated,
and dissenting sects continued to dispute whether Anglicanism was
in fact the established church.4 The state’s revolutionary constitution
of 1777 provided that “the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever hereafter be allowed within this State to all mankind.”5 The
state constitutional convention published a statement that with the
new constitution stating that “all such . . . statutes and acts . . . as
3 See Mark D. McGarvie, One Nation under Law: America’s Early National

Struggles to Separate Church and State (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University
Press, 2004), 97–130; Elizabeth Mensch, “Religion, Revival, and the Ruling
Class: A Critical History of Trinity Church,” Buffalo Law Review 36, no. 3
(Fall 1987): 427–571.
4 The so-called “Duke’s Laws” promulgated immediately after the
English takeover of New Amsterdam required local parishes to elect
overseers who could then choose any ordained Protestant minister for
the local church, who was paid from taxes collected by the local courts.
This system was later codified in the 1693 Ministry Act, which decreed that
in each parish “there shall be called, inducted, and established, a good
sufficient Protestant Ministry.” Quoted in Mensch, “Religion, Revival,
and the Ruling Class,” 444. The dispute over whether there was a single
established church in the colony centered on whether this law, which was
silent on the question, required that the minister be Anglican.
5 New York Const. art. XXXVIII (1777).
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may be construed to establish or maintain any particular denomination of Christians or their ministers . . . be and they are, abrogated
and rejected.”6 Shortly after the Revolution, however, parishioner
Alexander Hamilton fought off an effort to disincorporate Trinity,
the approach taken to disestablishment in Virginia.7 In 1784, the
legislature responded by abrogating the provisions in previously
granted corporate charters giving churches taxing authority.8 Prior
to this time, corporations had been formed by some special act of
the legislature, but in the new law the New York legislature took the
radical step of allowing any religious society to incorporate without
legislative action merely by electing trustees and filing papers with
the local court.9 This 1784 law and its descendants provided the basic
framework for Joseph Smith in 1830.
New York provided a model for many of the new states of the
expanding republic, including Ohio and Illinois, where the church
relocated.10 At the heart of this legal regime were three core
assumptions.11 The first was that as a legal entity a church consisted
of the aggregation of its individual members. A church corporation
was not an independent institution providing religious services and
6 Quoted

in McGarvie, One Nation under Law, 111.
Mensch, “Religion, Revival, and the Ruling Class,” 475–76.
8 See “An Act to remove doubts which may have arisen respecting
the charter rights of the minister, elders and deacons of the Reformed
Protestant Dutch Church of the city of New York, in consequence of the late
invasion of this State,” in Laws of New York 597 (1784); “An Act for making
such alterations in the charter of the Corporation of Trinity Church, as
to render it more conformable to the Constitution of the State,” in Laws
of New York 646 (1784).
9 See “An Act to enable all religious denominations in this State to
appoint trustees who shall be a body corporate, for the purpose for taking
care of the temporalities of their respective congregations, and for other
purposes therein mentioned,” in Laws of New York 613 (1784).
10 Missouri was an exception. Its 1820 Declaration of Rights provided
that “no religious corporation can ever be established in this state.”
Missouri Const. art. XIII, §5 (1820). In this, it followed the example of
Virginia, where disestablishment took the form of a blanket prohibition
on incorporation by churches.
11 For an excellent summary of this legal regime prior to the Civil
War, see Sarah Barringer Gordon, “The First Disestablishment: Limits on
Church Power and Property before the Civil War,” University of Pennsylvania
Law Review 162, no. 2 (January 2014): 307–72.
7 See

96

The Journal of Mormon History

instruction to congregants. Rather, it was a legal representation of
the congregants themselves. The second key assumption flowed from
the first: ecclesiastical control was to reside with the laity rather than
the clergy. During the mid-nineteenth century, this produced a series
of conflicts within the Catholic Church between the bishops on one
side, who insisted on the right to control parish property and choose
parish priests, and dissident church members on the other, who
were eager to use the power conferred on them by state corporate
law to control their own parishes.12 The third assumption was that
the amount of property that a church could hold must be sharply
limited. These so-called “mortmain” provisions had their origins in
the Tudor Reformation as the mechanism by which the crown seized
church property.13 In the United States, they reflected congregational
Protestant assumptions about church government and a hostility
toward the concentration of economic power in ecclesiastical hands.
For most of its history prior to the move to Utah, the church was
an unincorprated religious society. Church members very likely failed
to comply with the formalities required to organize under New York
law. Missouri law prohibited religious corporations, and it seems that
no effort was made to incorporate the church as opposed to various
church-related entities in Ohio.14 This changed in Nauvoo. Joseph
Smith borrowed large sums of money on the credit of the church to
purchase the land on which to build the city.15 However, because
the church lacked legal existence, this meant that the status of these
12 Patrick J. Dignan, A History of the Legal Incorporation of Catholic Church
Property in the United States (1784–1932) (Washington, D.C.: Catholic
University of America Press, 1933), 46–93.
13 See Paul G. Kauper and Stephen C. Ellis, “Religious Corporations
and the Law,” Michigan Law Review 71, no. 8 (August 1, 1973): 1499–1574.
14 See David Keith Stott, “Organizing the Church as a Religious
Association in 1830,” in Sustaining the Law: Joseph Smith’s Legal Encounters,
ed. Gordon A. Madsen, Jeffrey N. Walker, and John W. Welch (Provo,
UT: BYU Studies, 2014), 113–40; Max H. Parkin, “Joseph Smith and the
United Firm: The Growth and Decline of the Church’s First Master Plan
of Business and Finance, Ohio and Missouri, 1832–1834,” Brigham Young
University Studies 46, no. 3 (July 2007): 5–62; Jeffrey N. Walker, “The Kirtland
Safety Society and the Fraud of Grandison Newell: A Legal Examination,”
BYU Studies Quarterly 54, no. 3 (January 2015): 32–148. See also Missouri
Const. art. XIII, §5 (1820).
15 Glen M. Leonard, Nauvoo: Place of Peace, People of Promise (Salt Lake
City, UT: Deseret Book, 2002), 47–61.
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debts was ambiguous. Matters came to a head when a Nauvoo-based
steamboat sank.16 Joseph Smith had guaranteed the loan that the
promoters of the steamboat had used to finance its purchase and
after it sank, Smith became liable on the guarantee. In 1842, Congress
passed one of its recurrent nineteenth-century bankruptcy laws,
and Smith sought to take advantage of the law while it was in force.17
The statute made Smith’s personal assets available to his creditors
as a condition of discharge, and in order to preserve church assets
he sought to incorporate the church under Illinois law and transfer
church assets to this new legal entity prior to filing for bankruptcy. An
1839 Illinois law, however, limited religious corporations to owning at
most forty acres of land “for the purpose of camp-meeting ground.”18
Thus, at the time of Joseph Smith’s murder, the legal status of the
church was hopelessly complicated, contributing to the bitter disputes
between Brigham Young, as representative of the church, and Emma
Smith, who was the residual claimant on Smith’s estate.19
In 1851, the legislature of the State of Deseret sought to solve
these problems by granting the church a corporate charter. It
eliminated the issues that had bedeviled it for the previous two
decades.20 The law gave the church the unlimited ability to hold
property but did not break completely with American church law of
the time. It conceptualized the church as the corporate expression
of the members. It also contemplated ultimate lay control. Church
officers in control of church property were required to post bonds,
and “said trustee and assistant trustees shall continue in office during
the pleasure of said church.” At the same time, the statute was unique.
It provided that the church could “solemnize marriages compatible
16 Dallin H. Oaks and Joseph I. Bentley, “Joseph Smith and Legal
Process: In the Wake of the Steamboat Nauvoo,” Brigham Young University
Law Review 1976, no. 3 (September 1976): 735–82.
17 Prior to 1898, the United States had no permanent bankruptcy
legislation. Rather, Congress periodically passed bankruptcy laws in
response to financial downturns, only to repeal them a few years later.
See David A. Skeel, Debt’s Dominion: A History of Bankruptcy Law in America
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 23–47.
18 Act of March 2, 1839, 1838 Ill. Laws 267.
19 See Linda King Newell and Valeen Tippetts Avery, Mormon Enigma:
Emma Hale Smith, 2nd ed. (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1994),
200.
20 See Dale Morgan, The State of Deseret (Logan, UT: Utah State University
Press, 1987), 185–87.
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with the revelations of Jesus Christ,” a sly way of providing legal
recognition for plural marriages.21 It went on to provide the church
with the power to govern itself using language that envisioned a broad
competence and jurisdiction:
Said church . . . shall possess . . . the power and authority, in and
of itself, to originate, make, pass, and establish rules, regulations,
ordinances, laws, customs, and criterions, for the good order, safety,
government, conveniences, comfort, and control of said church, and
for the punishment or forgiveness of all offenses, relative to fellowship,
according to church covenants: that the pursuit of bliss, and the
enjoyment of life, in every capacity of public association, and domestic
happiness; temporal expansion; or spiritual increase upon the earth,
may not legally be questioned: provided, however, that each and every
act, or practice so established, or adopted for law, or custom, shall relate
to solemnities, sacraments, ceremonies, consecrations, endowments,
tithings, marriages, fellowship, or the religious duties of man to his
Maker, inasmuch as the doctrines, principles, or performances,
support virtue, and increase morality and are not inconsistent with, or
repugnant to, the Constitution of the United States, or of this State,
and are founded in the revelations of the Lord.22

After Congress organized the Utah Territory, the territorial legislature
adopted the previous statutes of the now defunct State of Deseret,
thus incorporating the church under American law.23
By 1860, the Republican party—founded to rid the territories
of the “twin relics of barbarism” (slavery and polygamy)—was in
power, and in 1862 the Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act repealed the Utah
statute incorporating the church and went on to limit its property
holdings to $50,000.24 The Morrill Act, however, remained a dead
letter in Utah for more than a decade, meaning that once again the
21 Ibid.,

186.

22 Ibid.
23

See Joint Resolution Legalizing the Laws of the Provisional
Government of the State of Deseret, Utah Laws 205 (1851).
24 Technically, there was a legal question as to whether the Morrill
Act disincorporated the church because it stated, “this act shall be so
limited . . . as not to affect or interfere with the right of property legally
acquired under [the church’s charter] . . . but only annul such acts and
laws which establish, maintain, protect, or countenance the practice
of polygamy.” Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act, ch. 126 §3, 12 Stat. 501 (1862).
Nevertheless, church leaders in Utah acted as though the church lacked
a separate legal existence after 1862.

Nathan B. Oman/Salt, Smurthwaite, and Smith

99

legal status of the church was uncertain. Brigham Young responded
by holding church property as “trustee in trust” (a legal neologism
invented in Nauvoo as part of the effort to untangle Joseph Smith’s
legal affairs).25 What this meant was that the property was titled
in Brigham Young’s name, but held on behalf of the church. The
precise nature of this holding, however, was uncertain. It was not clear
that there was a common law trust—in which case Young would have
held “bare legal title” while “equitable title” would have been held by
church members as a whole—or if the property was owned outright
by Brigham Young.26 Unsurprising, upon his death in 1877 another
bitter dispute between the church and heirs took place in the courts.27
25 See

Samuel D. Brunson, “Mormon Profit: Brigham Young, Tithing,
and the Bureau of Internal Revenue,” Brigham Young University Law Review
2019, no. 1 (Summer 2019): 43n7.
26 There were serious legal problems with conceptualizing the trustee
in trust as holding church property in trust for all church members. Under
the notoriously arcane common law rule against perpetuities, “No interest
subject to a condition precedent is good, unless the condition must be
fulfilled, if at all, within twenty-one years after some life in being at the
creation of the interest.” John Chipman Gray, The Rule against Perpetuities,
3rd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1915), 174. The purpose of the rule is to
insure that title to property is not clogged by legal interests that spring into
existence many lifetimes after the initial grant is made. A conveyance of
property to the trustee in trust to be held in trust for all church members
tries to create an interest in the property in favor of church members.
It is a condition precedent of that interest that the church members in
question be born. However, there are many church members that would
be born in the future outside of the time limits of the rule. Accordingly,
the attempted trust would fail. The property couldn’t strictly speaking be
held in trust for the church as an entity because as a matter of law likely
no such entity existed. At best, a trust could be created in favor of living
church members and those future church members who would be born
within the time limits of the rule. Brigham Young might also have held the
property as a charitable trust, meaning that there was no identifiable group
for whose benefit the property was held. In this case, the property would
simply have been held for a particular purpose, like advancing religion
or the like. Such a trust, however, would have exposed church finances
to potential oversight by government officials, who, unlike in the case of
ordinary trusts, are given standing to intervene in charitable trust cases.
27 Leonard J. Arrington, “The Settlement of the Brigham Young Estate,
1877–1879,” Pacific Historical Review 21, no. 1 (February 1952): 1–20.
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Successive presidents of the church continued to hold church
property personally as trustee in trust. In the early 1880s, Franklin
S. Richards, the church’s legal counsel, foreseeing that Congress was
likely to pass laws to escheat church property, urged the creation of
stake and ward corporations to which John Taylor as trustee in trust
could transfer church property to shield it from federal confiscation.28
It was difficult for Richards to persuade Taylor and other leaders,
but this was done around 1884. The law used was an 1878 statute
that allowed for the creation of corporations consisting of “persons
associated together for religious, social, scientific, benevolent or
other purposes”29 but limited their ability to hold property. “[N]o
such corporation,” the statute read, “must own or hold more real
estate than may be necessary for the business and objects of the
association.”30 The resulting corporations were also cumbersome,
requiring multiple trustees and the authoring of elaborate bylaws.
However, the strategy paid off when the solicitor general of the United
States ruled that property held by these corporations was not subject
to the Edmunds-Tucker Act passed in 1887.31 The law did, however,
allow a federal receiver to confiscate property not held by stake or
ward corporations, including, briefly, the Salt Lake Temple. Shortly
after the constitutionality of the Edmunds-Tucker Act was upheld
by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1890, Wilford Woodruff issued the
Manifesto, which stated that the church would no longer perform
plural marriages.32 In response, Charles Zane, chief justice of the Utah
Territorial Supreme Court, which was administering the case, ruled
that property should be returned to the trustee in trust to advance
the legal, nonpolygamous goals of the church.33

28 See Franklin S. Richards, “Reminiscences,” Church History Library,
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Salt Lake City (hereafter
Church History Library).
29 An Act supplemental to An Act providing for the Incorporating
Associations for Mining, Manufacturing, Commercial and other Industrial
Pursuits, approved February 18th, 1870, 1878 Laws of Utah 46, §1.
30 Id. at §3.
31 See Richards, “Reminiscences.”
32 See Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
33 See United States v. Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints, 8 Utah 310 (1892).
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Utah became a state in 1896 and the legislature adopted a law
allowing for the incorporation of religious societies.34 However, the
church chose not to avail itself of this law. Most local meetinghouses
continued to be held by stake and ward corporations. The remainder
of church property was held by the church president as trustee in
trust. The church had become heavily involved in the economic life
of the Intermountain West, in part due to the cooperative movement
of the 1870s.35 By the time of statehood, the United Orders of Young’s
time had largely ceased to function, but many of the businesses they
spawned continued as church-owned enterprises. In addition, the
church had invested in a variety of businesses from the Union Pacific
Railroad to the Utah salt industry as a way of fostering economic
growth and a diversified economy. With the arrival of a new century,
however, Latter-day Saint dreams of autarky were dead and increasingly
church-owned businesses were run along the lines of mainstream
American capitalism. This is how matters stood in 1904 when a dispute
over salt helped to spur on the transformation of the church’s legal
personality.

Salt and Smurthwaite
Charles Smurthwaite was born in England in 1862. At the age of
nineteen, he joined the church in Manchester and emigrated to
Utah, settling ultimately in Ogden.36 Although he never served a
mission for the church, he was ordained a seventy and was active in
the church-sponsored People’s Party in the 1890s.37 His estrangement
from the church seems to have begun around this time, when he
supported apostle Moses Thatcher in his political campaign and
34 See

Rev. Stat. Utah. §§343–46 (1897).
See Leonard Arrington, Great Basin Kingdom: An Economic History
of the Latter-Day Saints, 1830–1900 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1958); Leonard J. Arrington, Feramorz Y. Fox, and Dean L. May, Building
the City of God: Community and Cooperation among the Mormons, 2nd ed.
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992).
36 See Proceedings before the Committee on Privileges and Elections of the
United States Senate in the Matter of the Protests against the Right of Hon. Reed
Smoot, a Senator from the State of Utah, to Hold His Seat (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1906), 4:78 (hereafter Smoot Hearings).
37 See “People’s County Convention,” Salt Lake Herald-Republican,
October 4, 1890, 6; “Threatened with Ruin in His Salt Business,” Salt Lake
Telegram, March 15, 1905, 8.
35
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subsequent battle with church leaders.38 However, he was still active
in his ward in 1904 when, in association with Richard J. Taylor, son
of deceased church president John Taylor, he purchased controlling
shares in the Beck Salt Company and began investing to expand its
operations.39 Sometime later, then church president Joseph F. Smith
contacted Smurthwaite through Ogden capitalist David Eccles.40 At
a meeting in Salt Lake with the First Presidency and apostle John
Henry Smith, Smurthwaite and his associate learned that the church
controlled the Inland Crystal Salt Company, the Beck Salt Company’s
chief competitor. Indeed, after its creation via a merger with a
competitor in 1898, the Inland Crystal Salt Company had a de facto
monopoly on salt manufacture in Utah.41 Joseph F. Smith said, “I
am very surprised . . . that a man of your experience would go into
business in opposition to us without first coming to consult us. An
hour . . . would have set you brethren right on this matter if you had
come to consult us about it.”42 Smith suggested that if Smurthwaite
and his associates wished to invest in the salt business they might be
able to purchase shares in the Inland Crystal Salt Company, but that
if they continued, “We will ruin you” because the Inland Crystal Salt
Company would cut prices in the face of increased competition.43 By
that time, the church had been involved in the salt business since the
1880s, and the Inland Crystal Salt Company—due to its more efficient
capital investments—was capable of undercutting smaller, less efficient
producers such as the Beck Salt Company.44 The Inland Crystal Salt
Company was also allegedly part of the national “salt trust,” and thus
38 See “Smurthwaite Is Now Out,” Salt Lake Tribune, March 26, 1905,
1. See also Edward Leo Lyman, “The Alienation of an Apostle from His
Quorum: The Moses Thatcher Case,” Dialogue: A Journal of Mormon Thought
18, no. 2 (Spring 1985): 67–91; Kenneth W. Godfrey, “Moses Thatcher in
the Dock: His Trials, the Aftermath, and His Last Days,” Journal of Mormon
History 24, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 54–88.
39 See Smoot Hearings, 4:78; Cannon and O’Higgins, Under the Prophet
in Utah, 323.
40 See Smoot Hearings, 4:79.
41 John L. Clark, “History of Utah’s Salt Industry, 1847–1970” (master’s
thesis, Brigham Young University, 1971), 81–82, https://scholarsarchive
.byu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5602&context=etd.
42 Smoot Hearings, 4:79.
43 Ibid., 4:79–80.
44 See John L. Clark, “The Mormon Church and Utah Salt Manufacturing
1847–1918,” Arizona and the West 26, no. 3 (Autumn 1984): 225–42.
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may have been required to engage in unprofitable price cutting as
a way of driving competitors out of business.45
The interview with Smith was the final straw in Smurthwaite’s
mounting religious crisis. Two years earlier, the Utah legislature
chose apostle Reed Smoot to fill one of the state’s seats in the
United States Senate. The choice set off a furor of national protest,
and the Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections launched a
wide-ranging investigation into Mormon affairs in Utah.46 Joseph F.
Smith was called to testify before the United States Senate, where
he admitted to cohabitating with his plural wives after the Manifesto
of 1890. For Smurthwaite and many other Latter-day Saints, such
conduct not only violated unlawful cohabitation statutes but was also
sexually immoral, a violation of what they regarded as the church’s
new understanding of marriage. He informed his bishop that he
thought Smith was “a bad man” and not a prophet of God. He went
on to publish a lengthy letter in the Salt Lake Tribune in which he
denounced all forms of post-Manifesto polygamy, demanded that
church meetings be thrown open to debate on religious questions,
and that the church retire from all political and commercial affairs.47
He also wrote: “I demand that all tithes be accounted for in detail,
beginning at the next April conference, twice each year from that time
forward at general conferences; that a list of all property holdings of
the church and of the leaders of the church, acquired since he [sic]
became president, be read semiannually at each conference.”48 In
response, Smurthwaite’s “block teacher” preferred a charge against
him before his bishop for “apostasy and unchristianlike conduct” in
March 1905.49
45 Certainly, lower level employees of the Inland Crystal Salt Company
had used aggressive tactics against competitors in the 1890s, in one case
dynamiting a rival salt works, and in another case filling in a competitor’s
canal that crossed company property. See Clark, “History of Utah’s Salt
Industry,” 85–86.
46 See Kathleen Flake, The Politics of American Religious Identity: The
Seating of Senator Reed Smoot, Mormon Apostle (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2004); Harvard S. Heath, “The Reed Smoot Hearings:
A Quest for Legitimacy,” Journal of Mormon History 33, no. 2 (Summer
2007): 1–80.
47 Smoot Hearings, 4:83–90.
48 Ibid., 4:89.
49 Ibid., 4:92.
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Smurthwaite’s ecclesiastical trial became big news. Each stage of
the proceedings before the bishop’s court and the high council was
reported in the press.50 He raised the stakes by preferring his own
charge against Hyrum Goddard, the block teacher who began the
proceedings against him. Goddard was a polygamist who continued
to cohabitate with his plural wives, and Smurthwaite asked the bishop
to investigate him for “unchristianlike conduct.”51 Smurthwaite was
ultimately excommunicated on April 4, 1905.52
While the action against him seems to have arisen entirely at the
local level in response to his published letter to the Salt Lake Tribune,
press reports presented it as a vindictive plot instigated by Joseph F.
Smith against a business rival.53 State legislators and other politicians
discussed the case.54 The Salt Lake Tribune compared Smurthwaite
to the Book of Mormon prophet Abinadi standing before a wicked
King Noah in the person of Smith,55 and Godwin’s Weekly hinted
ominously that the case might require a return to the legal hardball
of the 1880s:
[I]t will be remembered that no arguments, nor prosecutions in the
old days in Utah had the least effect until a bill to disenfranchise
the whole organization was introduced into Congress. That brought
the manifesto of President Woodruff. He was sincere and so were
a few others who surrounded him; they wanted this alien system
placed in accord with free institutions. But no such spirit is apparent
50

See “About Mr. Smurthwaite,” Salt Lake Tribune, March 25, 1905,
1; “Smurthwaite and the Church,” Godwin’s Weekly, March 3, 1905, 3;
“Smurthwaite Charges Goddard with Living in Active Polygamy,” Ogden Daily
Standard, March 23, 1905, 6; “Smurthwaite Is Now Out”; and “Threatened
with Ruin in His Salt Business.”
51 See “Smurthwaite Charges Goddard with Living in Active Polygamy”;
“Smurthwaite Counters on Hyrum H. Goddard,” Salt Lake Telegram, March
23, 1905, 6.
52 See Smoot Hearings, 4:78.
53 See “Smurthwaite Is Now Out.”
54 See “Utah Editors Roast Solons,” Salt Lake Tribune, March 19, 1905, 3.
55 See “A Parallel for Mormons,” Salt Lake Tribune, April 8, 1905, 4.
The Tribune, however, was careful to insist it was writing “without assuming
that the Book of Mormon knew anything about Charles Smurthwaite or
Joseph F. Smith, or without assuming that Joseph F.’s uncle, the prophet,
made any such discovery as the plates.”
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among the leaders today and a caustic remedy is not only just, but
a necessary act of self-defense on the part of the nation. The man
who gives unquestioned allegiance to the rule of Joseph F. Smith
and believes he has a right to rule, cannot give any but qualified
allegiance to the Government of this Republic.56

If church leaders thought that Smurthwaite’s excommunication would
bring the controversy to an end, they were mistaken. Three days after
being expelled from the church, Smurthwaite filed a complaint in
the Third District Court in Salt Lake City in the case of Smurthwaite
et al. v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints et al., and the Salt
Lake County sherriff served the papers personally on Joseph F. Smith.57

Going to Law
Smurthwaite was joined in his lawsuit by thirty-six-year-old Don Carlos
Musser, the son of A. Milton Musser, a prominent Latter-day Saint
leader who was serving as assistant church historian at the time of
his son’s lawsuit against Joseph F. Smith. Musser had four plural
wives; Don Carlos’s mother, Mary Elizabeth White, was the second.58
During the Raid of the 1880s, Musser was convicted in a celebrated
unlawful cohabitation case where he refused an offer of leniency by
then territorial chief justice Zane, rather than pledge to abandon his
relationship with Mary, her children, and his other plural families.59
In 1891, Don Carlos was called to the Swiss-German Mission where
he served for a year. He was then made president of the Turkish
Mission from 1892 to 1894.60 Upon returning to the United States
and working in journalism for a time, he volunteered to serve in the
56 “Smurthwaite

and the Church.”
Smurthwaite et al. v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints et al., 3rd Judicial District Court, Utah, Case No. 7115, Utah State
Archives, Series 1622, Reel 171 (hereafter Smurthwaite v. Church). Sometimes
the pleadings and motions in the case are styled “Smurthwaite et al. v. The
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints et al.” and sometimes they are
styled “Smurthwaite et al. v. Joseph F. Smith et al.”
58 See Amos Milton Musser Sr. (1830–1909), https://www.familysearch.
org/tree/person/details/KW8X-P5W.
59 See C. C. Goodwin, History of the Bench and Bar of Utah (Salt Lake
City, UT: Interstate Press, 1913), 60–62.
60 See Don Carlos White Musser,https://history.churchofjesuschrist
.org/missionary/individual/don-carlos-white-musser-1869?lang=eng.
57 See
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Spanish-American War, eventually becoming editor of an English
language newspaper in the Philippines entitled Freedom.61 By 1905,
he had become disillusioned with the church over a variety of issues,
particularly polygamous husbands including his father continuing
to cohabitate with plural wives after the Manifesto.
As Smurthwaite’s excommunication was being finalized, the
church held its April 1905 general conference, and Don Carlos was
one of two members who cast a dissenting vote to the sustaining of
church leaders.62 In an interview at the time with the Salt Lake Tribune,
he called on common Mormon narratives of apostasy. Drawing on
anti-Catholic tropes, he compared Smith to the pope.63 “Is it not
possible that if the people who make up the Mormon church do
not think for themselves and act in accordance with their God-given
reason, they, too will fall away and apostatize?” he said. “Indeed, is
there a thinking, well informed man in the church, who cannot see
that a great change has come over his people; that there is a class
distinction in the church today that threatens the spiritual and
temporal welfare of the masses?”64
Despite Smurthwaite’s extended list of complaints against the
church in his published letter and Musser’s broad ranging objections to polygamy, Mormon theology, and conditions in Utah, the
legal issues in their lawsuit were fairly narrow. Suing on behalf of
themselves and “all other members of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints who may come into the case,” they asked the court

61 See

“Light to Be Thrown on Hierarch’s Method,” Salt Lake Tribune,
April 8, 1905, 1.
62 Ibid.
63 For the a discussion of the link between late nineteenth and early
twentieth-century Mormon narratives of the Great Apostasy and antiCatholicism, see Matthew Bowman, “James Talmage, B. H. Roberts, and
Confessional History in a Secular Age,” in Standing Apart: Mormon Historical
Consciousness and the Concept of Apostasy, ed. Miranda Wilcox and John D.
Young (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 77–92.
64 Don Carlos W. Musser, “Great Work for Utah Doing by the Tribune,”
Salt Lake Tribune, April 8, 1905, 9.
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to order Smith to provide an accounting for the investment of all
tithing funds and issue an injunction “restraining said defendants
from investing said funds . . . in any business or enterprise established
or prosecuted for commercial, industrial or business purposes.”65
The case was national news, with journalists embellishing beyond
the facts alleged in the lawsuit. The complaint contained no allegation that Smith was appropriating church funds or profiting from
church investments, but the New York Herald reported that he, “has
been charged with taking the money paid as an offering to the Lord
and using it for speculations to build up his own private wealth.”66
Given the origins of the dispute in the Inland Crystal Salt Company’s monopoly in Utah, one interesting question is why Smurthwaite
didn’t choose to pursue a case under the antitrust laws. In 1890
Congress had passed the Sherman Antitrust Act, which made “[e]
very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade . . . illegal.”67 Critics such as Frank
Cannon denounced the church’s involvement in the salt industry in
antitrust terms, although he suggests that at the time of the suit the
Inland Crystal Salt Company may not yet have formally been part of
the national “salt trust.”68 Antitrust suits over salt had been recently
brought elsewhere. In 1902, the federal government sued the “Federal
Salt Company . . . popularly known as the ‘Salt Trust’”69 in federal
court in San Francisco, obtaining a restraining order against price

65 Complaint,

Smurthwaite v. Church.

66 Reprinted as “Mormon Grip on Fair State,” Salt Lake Tribune, April 7,

1905, 3; see also “Mormon Church Row Is Taken into Court,” San Francisco
Call, April 8, 1905, 4.
67 Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 §1, 26 Stat. 209.
68 See Cannon and O’Higgins, Under the Prophet in Utah, 323. According to Cannon, all Latter-day Saints “must buy salt from ‘the Church’s’ salt
monopoly (Joseph F. Smith, president), which is part of, and pays dividends
to, the national salt trust” (365). However, this was written in 1911, not in
1905 when Smurthwaite filed his suit.
69 “Temporary Injunction against the ‘Salt Trust,’” American Law Review
36, no. 6 (1902): 907.
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fixing agreements.70 Furthermore, section 7 of the Sherman Act gave
victims of monopolies a private cause of action for violations of the
act, including the right to treble damages.71 Under the U.S. Supreme
Court’s 1894 decision in United States v. E.C. Knight Company, however,
the Sherman Act did not reach purely intrastate manufacturers of
“a necessity of life” such as the Inland Crystal Salt Company.72 Both
the Utah state constitution and an 1896 state statute prohibited “any
combination . . . having for its object or effect the controlling of the
prices of . . . any article of manufacturing.”73 However, it was unclear
whether the law provided an aggrieved party such as Smurthwaite
a private cause of action.74 Furthermore, Smith’s threat merely to
undersell Smurthwaite’s company was likely not prohibited by the
Utah law unless it could be shown to be part of a broader conspiracy
to control prices as opposed to merely underprice a competitor.
70 See J. H. Benton, “Sherman or Anti-Trust Act,” Yale Law Journal
18, no. 5 (1908–1909): 318–19. During this period, the “salt trust” in the
western United States was consistently associated with the Federal Salt
Company. See Theodore Roosevelt, Works: Presidential Addresses and State
Papers, Dec. 3, 1901, June 1910, and European Addresses (New York, NY: Review
of Reviews Publishing, 1910), 283–84. However, in his study of the salt
industry in Utah, John C. Clark never mentions any relationship between
the Inland Crystal Salt Company or any other Utah firm, and the Federal
Salt Company. See Clark, “History of Utah’s Salt Industry 1847–1970.” It is
very difficult to determine what formal relationship, if any, existed between
the Inland Crystal Salt Company and the “salt trust.” It is entirely possible
that Smurthwaite and his legal team were afflicted with a similar uncertainty, which might also explain the absence of an antitrust suit. Finally,
and perhaps most probably, antitrust law was still new in 1904 and quite
likely Zane and Smurthwaite simply weren’t familiar with its possibilities.
71 See Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 §7, 26 Stat. 209.
72 See United States v. E. C. Knight Company, 156 U.S. 1 (1894).
73 “To Prevent Pools and Trusts,”§1, 1896 Laws of Utah 125, chap. 39.
See also Utah Const. art. XII, §20 (1896). See James May, “The Role of the
States in the First Century of the Sherman Act and the Larger Picture of
Antitrust History,” Antitrust Law Journal 59, no. 1 (March 1990): 93–107;
James May, “Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the Formative Era: The
Constitutional and Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust Law, 1880–1918,”
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 135, no. 3 (March 1987): 496–593.
74 See Jonathan A. Dibble and James S. Jardine, “The Utah Antitrust
Act of 1979: Getting into the State Antitrust Business,” Utah Law Review
1980, no. 1 (1980): 75–76.
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Regardless, in his lawsuit Smurthwaite chose not to pursue any antitrust related claims against Smith, the church, or the Inland Crystal
Salt Company.
Inevitably with the filing of suit, lawyers became the leading
actors in the resulting drama. For their attorney, Smurthwaite and
Musser retained Charles Zane, one of the most prominent lawyers
in Utah. Zane was born in 1831 and admitted to the Illinois bar in
1857, becoming a member of the Springfield legal community just
as its leading light, Abraham Lincoln, rose to national prominence.
Zane had become a judge in Illinois when he was appointed chief
justice of the Utah Territorial Supreme Court in 1884.75 He presided
over that court during the most intense period of the polygamy raids
where he earned a reputation as a stern but essentially fair-minded
judge, in contrast to earlier anti-Mormon crusaders on the territorial bench.76 Upon Utah’s admission to the Union in 1896, he was
chosen chief justice of the new state supreme court, serving until
1899 when he entered private practice in Salt Lake City.77 Given his
reputation as a widely respected hero of the federal government’s
legal victories over the church, the choice of Zane gave a certain
gravitas to Smurthwaite’s and Musser’s suit.
Joseph F. Smith was represented by Franklin S. Richards. The
son of apostle Franklin D. Richards, as a young man Richards had
planned on a medical career. That changed after a conversation with
Brigham Young in which the aging president urged him to study
law instead. Young said, “[T]he time will come when the Latter-day
Saints will need lawyers of their own to defend them in the Courts
and strive with fearless inspiration to maintain their constitutional
rights.”78 Richards abandoned medicine and after a course of self-
directed study was admitted to the Utah bar in 1874. The timing of his
entry into the legal profession couldn’t have been better for a young
Latter-day Saint attorney. He became the church’s general counsel
in 1880, just as the hard fought legal battles over the polygamy raids
were beginning and argued the church’s position before the territorial
75 See

Goodwin, History of the Bench and Bar of Utah, 221.
Thomas G. Alexander, “Charles S. Zane: Apostle of a New Era,”
Utah Historical Quarterly 34, no. 3 (Fall 1966): 290–314.
77 Goodwin, History of the Bench and Bar of Utah, 221.
78 Quoted in Ken Driggs, “‘Lawyers of Their Own to Defend Them’:
The Legal Career of Franklin Snyder Richards,” Journal of Mormon History
21, no. 2 (October 1995): 88.
76 See
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courts, as well as handling its numerous appeals before the United
States Supreme Court.79 In addition, he worked with George Q.
Cannon and others as an emissary for church leaders with legal and
political leaders in the East. By 1905, he was an experienced attorney
in the prime of his career with decades of experience defending the
interests of his church in court.
Richard struck a confident air with reporters when the suit was
filed. “I feel assured in saying the whole matter will come to nil,” he
said. “I do not wish my words to be taken as casting any reflection upon
such an able practitioner as Judge Zane, but nevertheless, I cannot see
any other result.” He went on to say, “I had a long talk with President
Smith last night, but this matter was not touched upon. As you know, I
represent the Mormon church in all legal matters, and for that reason
these papers have been turned over to me.” Finally, as a good advocate,
he ended by trying to change the public framing of the case away from
grasping hierarchs speculating with the money of widows and orphans.
He said: “The tithings are purely voluntary; they are not forced. They
are never diverted from church work. Just so long as the tithings are
properly used for the furthering of church and religious ends steps
to prevent their voluntary contribution are absurd. The Mormon
church has nothing to fear.”80 Despite the lawyer’s confident public
face, behind the scenes Joseph F. Smith was concerned. Richards later
wrote, “President Smith was considerably disturbed in his mind about
the suit and offered to employ additional counsel.” Richards, however,
insisted that “we were entirely able to win the case ourselves.”81

The Legal Arguments
The surviving case file contains no briefing by the parties, and one
must therefore reconstruct the legal theories in the lawsuit from
pleadings and newspaper reports of oral arguments. Zane’s initial
theory seems to have been that the church was a legal entity of which
79 See Driggs, “‘Lawyers of Their Own to Defend Them’”; Goodwin,
History of the Bench and Bar of Utah, 189. In cases before the U.S. Supreme
Court, the church generally retained a prominent member of the Supreme
Court bar to argue the case with Richards.
80 “Suit to Compel an Accounting of Tithing Cause of Great Interest;
Judge Richards Talks of the Case,” Salt Lake Telegram, April 8, 1905, 1.
81 Franklin S. Richards, Memorandum, “Musser-Smurthwaite Suit
against President Smith to Enjoin Him from Investing Church Funds in
Secular Enterprises, 1905–1906,” Church History Library.
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Joseph F. Smith was the trustee.82 As members of the corporation,
Smurthwaite and Musser were entitled to demand an accounting and
obtain an injunction against the wayward custodian of the church’s
funds. The idea seems to have been that as a matter of law the church
was an inherently religious entity, and it would be ultra vires—beyond
the corporation’s legal powers—for it to use funds for any commercial
activities. In this he would seem to have been on good legal ground,
given the 1897 Utah law limiting religious corporations to activities
set out in their articles of incorporation. This view of the case is
buttressed by the presence of Musser in the suit. Smurthwaite was
the primary mover in suing the church, and it is possible that Musser
was added as a plaintiff to forestall the argument that because of
his excommunication Smurthwaite was no longer a member of the
corporation and therefore lacked standing to sue.
Richards responded by filing a demurrer insisting that “the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints [sic] is improperly made
defendant . . . because the said Church is a voluntary religious
association, and not a corporation or legal entity.”83 In this Richards
was correct. Thirteen years before, as territorial chief justice, Zane
had presided over the proceedings in the territorial supreme court
confirming that the church’s 1850 incorporation had been nullified
by Congress. Perhaps because he and his clients were aware of the
flurry of local incorporations by wards and stakes, Zane seems to have
assumed that the church had incorporated under Utah law subsequent
to statehood. This, however, was not the case. As a result of his error,
Zane had to shift the ground of his legal theory. He could no longer
rely directly on church articles of incorporation and the Utah statute.
He filed an amended complaint that dropped the allegation that
the church had been incorporated under Utah law and added the
82 See

Complaint, Smurthwaite v. Church.
Smurthwaite v. Church. A demurrer is a motion in which a
defendant, rather than contesting the factual accuracy of the complaint’s
assertions as would be done in an answer, claims that even if all of the factual
claims in the complaint are correct, that the plaintiff is still not entitled to
a remedy. Richards’s motion was open to the objection that it wasn’t truly
a demurrer because he denied that the church was incorporated under
Utah law, as was asserted in the complaint. This could be characterized as a
factual question calling for a trial and thus outside the scope of a demurrer.
Zane, however, chose not to contest this point, in all likelihood because
he realized that it was pointless to do so because Richards was correct.
83 Demurrer,
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rest of the First Presidency and the Presiding Bishop as additional
defendants.84 His new theory of the case relied on an ordinary trust
argument. At common law a trust is created when a settlor confers
property on a trustee with the expressed intention that the property
be used for the benefit of some specifically identifiable beneficiary.
Zane seems to have reasoned that tithe payers were settlors who
conveyed property to church officials as trustees on behalf of church
members. Trustees owe strict fiduciary duties to beneficiaries, who
have standing to sue them if they fail to use the property as intended
by the settlors. However, the trust is a very flexible device. Its primary
purpose is to advance the intentions of the settlor, which must be
determined by the court to know the scope of the beneficiaries’ rights.
This meant that Smurthwaite and Musser had to provide evidence
as to the intention of the specific settlors/tithe payers under whose
trust they were suing.
In his demurrer to Zane’s amended complaint, Richards
demanded that the identity and intentions of these tithe payers be
set out with specificity.85 In support of his argument, he seems to have
cited two cases to the court.86 The first was Pulpress v. African Methodist
Episcopal Church,87 a case decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in 1864. It grew out of a dispute over a bequest to the AME churches
around Pittsburgh. The plaintiffs argued that the trustees in the case,
the pastor and trustees of the largest AME Church in the city, were
using the bequested property entirely for the benefit of the large
urban church rather than to help the outlying rural congregations.
The original bequest, however, had simply stated that the property
was for the use of “the African Methodist Church.” Accordingly, the
court ruled that the exercise of discretion by church leaders could
84 Amended

Complaint, Smurthwaite v. Church.
to Amended Complaint, Smurthwaite v. Church.
86 In many ways the nineteenth century was a golden age of church
litigation, as numerous denominations and congregations divided over
not only theology, but also the politics of slavery and emancipation in
the run up to the Civil War and its aftermath. See Kellen Funk, “Church
Corporations and the Conflict of Laws in Antebellum America,” Journal
of Law and Religion 32, no. 2 (July 2017): 263–84. This is the body of case
law from which Richards drew his arguments. Interestingly, Richards never
seems to have raised the rule against perpetuities objection to Zane’s trust
theory. See discussion supra note 26.
87 Pulpress v. African Methodist Episcopal Church, 48 Pa. 208 (1864).
85 Demurrer
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not be attacked because there was no more specific deed limiting
their discretion. The attractions of the case to Richards were obvious.
It suggested that so long as property was used for the church, its use
could not be attacked absent a more specific deed. He also cited to
Penfield v. Skinner, a Vermont case involving a trust created for the
education of poor boys in the ministry.88 The court found that so
long as the property was not diverted to another use, the particular
way in which it was spent in support of such poor boys couldn’t be
attacked absent a specific deed.
Smurthwaite’s case was heard before Judge Charles W. Morse.
Morse was born in Cambridge, Illinois.89 His family moved to Kansas
when he was a teenager, and it was there that he studied law and
was admitted to the bar in 1880.90 Although he was moderately
successful in local politics in Kansas, in 1888 he “yielded to the call of
the further West.” Once in Utah, he was active in Republican politics,
but seems to have arrived in the territory too late to be caught up in
the bonanza of legal business created by the federal crusade against
polygamy. Religiously he was described as a “spiritually minded
man” and served as the president of the board of trustees of the First
Methodist Episcopal Church in Salt Lake City, a post that may have
given him some practical insight into the issues involved in the case.
In 1905 he had been on the bench for four years and would serve
for another eleven years before retiring into private practice.91
Judge Morse accepted Richards’s theory of the case. In a six-page
written opinion, he sided with Smith on Richards’s demurrer, writing:
It is well settled by an almost unbroken line of decisions that the
civil courts will take jurisdiction of suits to prevent the misappropriation of church funds or property, or of any attempted application
of the same, not warranted by the terms upon which the fund was
created or the property acquired, or of the rules and regulation of
the society. But before the courts will interfere to exercise a visitorial control over the management, disposal or investment of such
property or funds, it must clearly appear from the averments of the
bill, that the acts complained of are unwarranted or unauthorized,
and that the trust repose in those to whom the management and

88 Penfield

v. Skinner, 11 Vt. 296 (1839).
Meeting Issue,” Utah Bar Bulletin, 1938, 6.
90 Ibid.; Goodwin, History of the Bench and Bar of Utah, 178.
91 “Annual Meeting Issue,” 6.
89 “Annual
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control of such property of fund has been committed, is being or
is about to be violated.92

He cited both Pulpress v. African Methodist Episcopal Church and Penfield
v. Skinner. He pointed out that none of the pleadings or arguments
in the case suggested that investments by the church were illegal,
“nor was it contended that any of the trust property was being . . .
appropriated by the defendants.”93 However, in ruling for Richards
and the church, Morse had not disposed of the case. Zane was free
to once again amend his complaint and allege new facts that could
give rise to a valid cause of action. This is exactly what he did on
December 16, 1905.94
The court’s ruling left Zane in a difficult position. His trust
theory required that there be some specific evidence of the settlors’
intentions that was being violated by Joseph F. Smith as trustee in
trust. In his opinion, Morse stated that one could look to the articles
of incorporation or other controlling ecclesiastical documents for
evidence of such an intent.95 However, as Zane acknowledged in
his second amended complaint: “[T]he Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter Day Saints [sic] is a voluntary religious association and has
no constitution or by laws and has no articles of association; nor has
said Church adopted any rule or rules, regulation or regulations
designating the purpose or purposes to which the Church fund in
the hands of the said trustee in trust may or can be devoted.”96
Accordingly, Zane adopted two new theories of the case. The
first was that donations to religious associations could not be used
“otherwise than for Church purposes.” There was a default rule that
governs when a settlor is silent as to his or her intentions, Zane in
effect argued. This rule required the court to divine between “Church
purposes” and merely “secular purposes,” ruling that the latter violated the fiduciary duties of the trustee. Unfortunately for his case,
Zane couldn’t seem to point to any legal authority in support of this
argument. His second theory was more ambitious. He argued that “it
is a violation of public policy for said church or its trustee to engage
in various kinds of secular business by the use of Church funds and
92 Decision

upon Demurrer to Complaint, Smurthwaite v. Church.

93 Ibid.
94 See

Second Amended Complaint, Smurthwaite v. Church.
Decision upon Demurrer to Complaint, Smurthwaite v. Church.
96 Second Amended Complaint, Smurthwaite v. Church.
95 See
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is therefore unlawful.”97 The advantage of this argument is that it
did not require Zane to provide evidence of tithe-payers’ intentions.
Rather, he was claiming that even if tithe payers intended to allow
the church to invest in secular businesses, it was unlawful for the
church to do so. Again, the disadvantage of this argument was that
he couldn’t point to any legal authority directly stating that Utah had
such a public policy.
Richards filed another demurrer and an oral argument on the
second amended complaint was heard in July 1906.98 Richards’s
response was straightforward. He denied that any default rule or
public policy of the kind contended for by Zane existed. He pointed
out that churches frequently engaged in secular business. Richards
told the court:
While churches did not engage extensively in such business . . . the
Methodist Church was in the book business and other business and
there was no law against it. Counsel might say it is very bad taste,
but I don’t know how far I would take issue with him in engaging in
certain kinds of business; but we are not here to discuss this question.
It is a question of law. It cannot engage in business that would be
subversive of good government or public morals, but it is lawful to
engage in legitimate business and it is not against public policy.99

Richards’s example of the Methodists was well chosen. In the
mid-nineteenth century, the combined Methodist Book Concerns was
the largest commercial publisher in the world.100 Furthermore, it had
been the object of a bitter dispute when Methodism split apart over
the issue of slavery in the years before the Civil War.101 All of this was
likely familiar to Judge Morse, a devout Methodist. Richards ended
with a sly parting shot against Zane. Almost twenty years before, as
territorial chief justice, Zane had decided the two cases involving
the disincorporation of the church under the Edmunds-Tucker
Act.102 In that litigation, George Romney and other members of
97 Ibid.
98 See Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint, Smurthwaite v. Church;
“Joseph F. Smith and the Tithes,” Salt Lake Tribune, July 7, 1906, 2.
99 “Joseph F. Smith and the Tithes.”
100 See Gordon, “The First Disestablishment,” 364.
101 Ibid., 361–63.
102 See United States v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 5
Utah 361 (1887); United States v. Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints, 8 Utah 310 (1892).
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the church sought to intervene in the litigation to assert their rights
as beneficiaries of any property held in trust for the church. Their
application was denied because, in the words of Richards, the court
held that “the contributions having been made to the church that
the individual members had no further interest in them.”103 In other
words, Zane had ruled that the tithes were gifts rather than the corpus
of a trust created by tithe payers as trust settlors. Thus, Richards had
the fun of citing judge Zane as negative precedent against lawyer Zane.
In his argument, Richards conceded that tithing funds had to
be used for church purposes. He disputed that this was confined to
the maintenance of religious buildings, payment of church officers,
and support for the poor, the purposes that Zane was willing to
acknowledge as legitimate. Zane insisted, however, that “all legal
principles are a definition.”104 It wasn’t sufficient for Richards to
assert that investments were for church purposes. The defendants
must either point to articles of incorporation or the like explicitly
allowing investments in secular businesses, Zane argued, or else the
court ought to use a definition of “church purposes” that excluded
business activities. He then went on to argue that regardless of any
idiosyncratic definition that might be offered as to “church purposes,”
the public policy of Utah prohibited churches from carrying on
business practices.
In support of the existence of such a public policy, Zane pointed
to two sources in Utah law. The first was the state constitution, which
stated, “No corporation shall engage in any business other than that
expressly authorized in its charter, or articles of incorporation.”105
The second was the state corporation code, which provided for
the incorporation of religious corporations but limited them to
the activities specified in their corporate charters.106 The statutory
sections, however, did not explicitly limit the ability of religious
corporations to be involved in profit-making enterprises. Rather,
he pointed to section 346 of the code, which stated merely that
“corporations not for pecuniary profit shall have power . . . to receive
and hold such property . . . as may be necessary to carry on or promote
the objects of the corporation, society, or association.”107 Zane sought
103 “Joseph

F. Smith and the Tithes.”

104 Ibid.
105 Utah
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to bolster his argument by retreating into aphorism, insisting that “law
is the perfection of human reason” and it would not be reasonable
to allow unincorporated religious societies to engage in commerce
while forbidding such commerce to incorporated societies.108 He
ended with a parade of horribles that would result from the position
argued for by Richards:
It would be a beautiful sight to behold the Presbyterian church, and
the Mormon church, and the Catholic church, and the Methodist
church engage in a scramble of trickery of business as it is carried
on too often. It necessarily follows if this church has the right to do
it then every other church has, and I say there is no church that I
know in the United States that engages in all kinds of business, and
no corporation does so. . . . I confess that the idea of this church
engaging in all kinds of business is an alarming one. I know that in
the middle ages, and comparatively modern times in Europe, the
church undertook to do almost everything and it resulted in cutting
off a great many heads, and breaking up of a great many people on
wheels and so on, but the churches of this country are limited to
the purpose of their organization.109

In short, the position of the church was un-American and dangerous
to civil liberty.
Judge Morse was never given a chance to rule on the second
amended complaint. Before he could issue a decision, Zane filed a
motion asking to withdraw the suit on the grounds that his clients
were no longer willing to post the appeal bond necessary to continue
the litigation.110 It is also possible, however, that Zane withdrew the
second amended complaint because he persuaded his clients that they
108 “Joseph F. Smith and the Tithes.” The aphorism that “law is the
perfection of human reason” is often ascribed to the seventeenth-century
English jurist Edward Coke, although I have been unable to locate any place
where Coke actually says this. It is likely a distillation—or a corruption—of
his famous claim in the Prohibitions Del La Roy, Coke Rep. 63, 65 (K.B. 1607),
that law cases are “decided not by natural reason but by the artificiall reason
and judgment of Law. . . . And that the Law was the Golden metwand and
measure to try the Causes of the Subjects.” Regardless, Zane’s reliance on
the well-worn aphorism signaled both his legal erudition and his inability
to find any more helpful precedent for his client. This would not have
gone unnoticed by Judge Morse.
109 “Joseph F. Smith and the Tithes.”
110 Smurthwaite v. Church.
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were unlikely to prevail. A dismissal of the case prior to the court’s
decision would be without prejudice, meaning it could be filed again.
Indeed, after Morse granted Zane’s motion to withdraw the case,
Smurthwaite told the press that he and Musser contemplated refiling
in federal court.111 (Nothing seems to have come of this idea.) At
the end of the day, Zane’s second amended complaint contained no
new factual allegations, and Morse’s decision on the earlier amended
complaint suggested that Zane was unlikely to persuade the court.
Withdrawal of the case avoided handing the church a clear victory
and left open the implicit threat of future litigation.

Aftermath
When Smurthwaite v. Smith was dismissed in 1906, Franklin S. Richards
had been thinking deeply about the legal status of the church for
more than a quarter century. When the suit was filed, most church
property was held by ward or stake corporations. Originally, these
corporations were governed by cumbersome articles of incorporation
and bylaws. This structure created a variety of risks. First, relatively
complex corporate formalities had to be maintained or the wards and
stakes risked losing their corporate charters. Second, the acquisition
and transfer of property required that the complicated internal governance procedures of the corporations be followed exactly or risk
invalidity. Third, upon the death or release of ward or stake officers
serving as corporate trustees, relatively strict legal formalities had to
be observed to replace them. Finally, because the corporations were
self-governing entities, there was a risk that the church hierarchy
could lose control over church property if enough local congregants
wished to go their own way. All of these factors likely contributed to
John Taylor’s hesitancy in forming such corporations in the early
1880s and his insistence that the governing board of trustees be
as large as possible under then existing Utah territorial law, likely
reflected concern about concentrating power over church property
in the hands of local leaders.
By 1901, Richards had hit upon a solution to these problems.
Borrowing the strategy adopted by the Catholic hierarchy in the
United States, he proposed that stake and ward corporations be

111 See “Investing Tithing Funds of Saints,” Salt Lake Tribune, November
23, 1906, 12.
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reorganized as corporations sole.112 The corporation sole would
consist of a single person, either the stake president or bishop.
Furthermore, the identity of this person would be defined in terms of
their ecclesiastical status. In other words, a bishop who was released or
died would automatically cease to be the occupant of the corporation,
which would continue to exist until his successor was chosen by the
church hierarchy. This eliminated the risk of title to church property
passing by operation of law to the heirs of church leaders or of rogue
leaders taking control of church assets. Richards later wrote:
It occurred to me that this system was admirably adapted to our
condition, and after giving the matter careful consideration, I
suggested it . . . to the First Presidency. After much deliberation they
decided to adopt this plan, which involved the necessity of getting
the legislatures of states where our wards and stakes were located to
enact laws providing for the creation of corporations sole to hold
title to church property. We finally succeeded, after much effort and
persuasion in getting laws passed in Idaho, Utah, Nevada, Arizona,
and Wyoming providing for corporations sole.113

In 1901, Rulon S. Wells, a member of the First Council of the
Seventy then serving in the Utah House of Representatives, introduced
a bill providing for the creation of corporations sole, which passed
unanimously.114 It is clear that originally this statute was intended only
for the use of wards and stakes. Thus, while only an “arch-bishop,
bishop, overseer, presiding elder, rabbi or clergyman”115 could
formally be a member of the corporation, the corporation could
not dispose of property without “the consent of the majority of the
members of the church or religious society present at a meeting duly
112 See Dignan, A History of the Legal Incorporation of Catholic Church
Property, 215–16; F. W. Maitland, “Corporation Sole,” Law Quarterly Review
16, no. 4 (1900): 335–54; M. W. S., “The Corporation Sole,” Michigan Law
Review 26, no. 5 (1928): 545–51.
113 Franklin S. Richards, “Corporations and Land Titles,” Memorandum
to the Presiding Bishop and the First Presidency, November 2, 1931,
typescript, Church History Library.
114 See “Church and Charitable Incorporations,” in Laws of the State of
Utah (1901) (Salt Lake City:Deseret News, 1901), 78–79; see also Andrew
Jenson, “Wells, Rulon Seymour,” in Latter-Day Saint Biographical Encyclopedia,
4 vols. (Salt Lake City, UT: Andrew Jenson History, 1901), 1:212–16.
115 “Church and Charitable Incorporations,” 78, §2.
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called for that purpose.”116 Such a procedure would clearly be too
cumbersome for use by the president of the church.
However, Richards’s thinking on this topic was continuing to
develop. In 1903, almost certainly at the discreet request of the
church, the Utah legislature replaced the 1901 statute with a new
law governing corporations sole.117 By this point, Richards was clearly
thinking of providing a corporate existence above the stake and ward
level. The religious officials allowed to incorporate as a corporation
sole now included “bishop, president, trustee in trust, and president
of stake.” The inclusion of the term “trustee in trust” is particularly
telling, because this term was a neologism coined in Nauvoo for the
president of the church. However, it is also clear that the church
hierarchy had not yet decided to avail itself of incorporation. The
evidence for this can be seen in the statute. Incorporating the trustee
in trust as a corporation sole would eliminate the possibility of a dispute between the church and the heirs of a deceased president of
the kind that had broken out upon the deaths of Joseph Smith and
Brigham Young. Richards, however, inserted a provision in the law
providing that in the case of: “A trustee in trust . . . who at the time
of his death . . . was holding the title to trust property for the use
or benefit of any church . . . and not incorporated as a corporation
sole . . . the title to any and all such property . . . shall not revert to
the donor, nor vest in the heirs of such deceased person, but shall . . .
116 Ibid.,

§4.
“Incorporation of Churches and Religious Societies,” in Laws
of the State of Utah (1903) (Provo, UT: Skelton Publishing, 1903), 62–63.
While Richards did not explicitly claim authorship of the 1903 law, he did
claim authorship of the 1901 law. See Richards, “Corporations and Land
Titles.” There is, however, very good reason to suppose that the 1903 law
was authored and introduced in the state legislature at his request. The
law was introduced by William Newjent Williams, an English convert to
the church who was married to Clarissa W. Smith, daughter of apostle and
counselor to Brigham Young, George A. Smith. Williams served as a missionary in Australia and at the time he introduced the law was a high priest.
Clarissa was the treasurer of the church-wide Relief Society organization.
In short, he was precisely the kind of loyal and well-connected Latter-day
Saint that the church would have used to get the law introduced. It was
passed unanimously by the legislature. See Utah Senate Journal, 1903;
Biographical Record of Salt Lake City and Vicinity (Chicago, IL: National Historical Record, 1902), 279–81.
117 See
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vest in the person appointed to fill such vacancy.”118 In other words,
the statute solved this problem without requiring the hierarchy to
decide on whether to incorporate. Likewise, the 1901 provision requiring a vote by church members prior to the conveyancing of church
property was eliminated from the 1903 version of the law. Thus, when
Smurthwaite v. Smith was being fought, an alternative legal identity for
the president of the church had been created but not yet assumed.
Richards did not explicitly reference the Smurthwaite case in
his accounts of the legal structure of the church.119 However, the
case illustrates the problems created when the top hierarchy of the
church was left without any formal legal existence. Joseph F. Smith
was styled as a trustee in trust, but in Smurthwaite Richards clearly
wanted to resist the idea that the president of the church was a
trustee in the ordinary common law sense. He could not be a trustee
on behalf of the church as a legal beneficiary because the church as
such did not exist as a legal entity. At the same time, to say that he
held church property as a trustee for every church member exposed
him to enormous potential liability and created an opportunity for
ecclesiastical disputes by disgruntled members to spill over into the
courts. As it had developed in the nineteenth century, however, the
traditional assumptions of corporate law that applied to churches
were essentially hostile to the hierarchical priesthood structure
of Latter-day Saint ecclesiology. In particular, the emphasis on
congregational structure worked awkwardly for denominational rather
than congregational buildings such as temples or mission homes.
Likewise, the law’s emphasis on lay control created a system in which
ecclesiastical disputes could be refought in the courts, as happened
repeatedly in other denominations during the nineteenth century.120
The Smurthwaite case was an effort to apply this basic approach to
the church, and in winning the case, Richards provided the church
hierarchy with the time to develop an alternative.
Ten years after the Smurthwaite case, the solution that had been
latent in Utah law since 1903 was adopted when the Corporation
118 “Incorporation

of Churches and Religious Societies,” 63, §9.

119 See Richards, “Corporations and Land Titles”; Franklin S. Richards,

“Address Delivered by President Franklin S. Richards to the High Priests
Quorum of the Ensign Stake, Sunday November 13, 1932,” typescript,
Church History Library.
120 See Gordon, “The First Disestablishment”; Funk, “Church Corporations and the Conflict of Laws in Antebellum America.”
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of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints was organized. Seven years later, in 1923, Richards created the
Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints, finally providing a formal legal structure for the church
completely independent of the personal identity of the hierarchy.
For most of the twentieth century, this dual structure of corporations
sole provided the legal framework for the church. In 2019, after more
than a century, the Corporation of the President was merged into the
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop, which was renamed The Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Thus, for the first time since 1862,
there was an operating legal entity bearing that name. However, The
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints as a legal matter remained
a corporation sole, meaning that in 2019 it had but a single member,
Russell M. Nelson, who became the incumbent of the corporation
sole after the merger of the earlier entities. This odd structure is a
legacy of Mormonism’s effort to find a legal structure less infected
with Protestant ecclesiology than that which was on offer in the legal
world into which it was born. It may also be, in part, a legacy of the
long-forgotten dispute over salt between Charles Smurthwaite and
Joseph F. Smith.

